A Review of Australian Audit Pricing Literature by Ferguson, A
This article is (c) Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
(http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/research/handle/10453/10312). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited.'
 A Review of Australian Audit Pricing Literature 
 Andrew C. Ferguson 
School of Accounting 
 University of New South Wales 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides a review of the extensive contributions made to the audit pricing 
literature by researchers utilizing Australian data. Recent United States [hereafter US] 
regulatory requirements under the Sarbanes Oxley Act (Section 102) have mandated 
disclosure of audit fees. As such this is a useful occasion to review the existing 
Australian audit pricing research, since the audit fee disclosure advantage once 
enjoyed by Australian researchers has now effectively dissipated. Beginning with the 
origins and genesis of audit pricing research in Australia, this review then discusses 
the key contributions to the literature over time. It concludes with some brief 
discussion of potential research directions.   
Keywords: Audit pricing, Audit quality, Auditor industry specialization 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Australian researchers have for many years been at the forefront of the audit pricing 
literature. This situation has in large part resulted from the public disclosure of 
audit fee data in the annual reports of listed Australian companies. Since audit fees 
have not been disclosed in the US until 2002, Australian researchers have held a 
comparative advantage over their US counterparts, who were previously forced to 
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acquire data through survey methods, or by direct approach to the accounting firms 
themselves. Both these methods have proved unreliable in terms of data supply on an 
ongoing basis, and thus constrained US research output in this area.  
The post-Enron disclosure regime in the US now provides for similar audit fee 
disclosure to that mandated in AASB 101.
1
 Since the Australian audit fee data source 
advantage has now disappeared, this appears to be a useful occasion to review the 
existing Australian audit pricing evidence, and to suggest some possible future 
directions for Australian researchers. The review is also timely in light of recent 
regulatory interest in the public accounting profession including The Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness (2000) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the US, and the Ramsay 
Report (2001) and the CLERP Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act (2004) in 
Australia. Regulatory interest has seen the practise of auditing placed under the 
microscope.  
The review is structured as follows: In the Section 2, the origins of the audit 
pricing model and the theory of audit quality are discussed. Section 3 includes a 
review of the ‘early’ Australian literature focussed on product differentiation and 
pricing premiums for large audit firms. Section 4 examines pricing premiums for the 
industry specialist auditors. Section 5 extends discussion in Section 4 and overviews 
recent literature on industry specialist premiums at the local office level. Finally in 
Sections 6.1 – 6.3 some possible future research directions are briefly discussed.   
 
                                                 
1
 It is noted that AASB 101, consistent with provisions in the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program [hereafter CLERP] Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 24
th
 June 2004, requires 
enhanced disclosure of monetary payments to auditors for differing types of non-audit services such as 
tax, consulting, IT, audit related, and accounting and due diligence. This is significant since the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) Section 201 effectively prohibits an auditor from performing all other types 
of non-audit services apart from tax in the US. Thus, the allowance of the auditor to (i) perform, and 
for the client to (ii) disclose differing types of non-audit services in Australia maintains an interesting 
non-audit fee advantage for Australian researchers. Implications of this enhanced disclosure are 
discussed further in the Section 6.2 ‘Auditor Independence’ where possible future research directions 
are discussed. 
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2.0 Origins of the audit pricing model 
Simunic (1980) provides the theoretical underpinning for the most often applied audit 
fee model used in economics of auditing research. For the auditee, Simunic suggests 
that an audit functions as a type of insurance, the benefits of which arise from liability 
avoidance to financial statement users (shareholders, creditors) in the event of 
litigation. This theoretical approach also explains the relative demand for internal 
versus external auditing. Simunic argues that a substitution effect occurs between 
internal and external auditing, dependent on the relative strength of the client’s 
internal controls.     
From the supply perspective, the key determinants of audit prices are those 
factors deemed to contribute to an auditors’ potential loss exposure arising from such 
litigation. To identify these drivers of potential auditor loss exposure, Simunic (1980) 
adopted an inductive research approach. Discussions were held with representatives 
of large audit firms, and also providers of professional liability insurance.
2
 From these 
discussions, a number of factors were identified as supply side determinants of loss 
exposure. These included (a) the size of the auditee, (b) the complexity of the 
auditee’s operations, (c) the risk of the auditee’s operations, and (d) the industry of the 
auditee. The empirical proxies developed by Simunic for each determinant form the 
basis of the audit fee model, applied in the majority of subsequent audit pricing 
studies both in Australian and abroad.  
Whilst Simunic (1980) is credited with the theoretical development of the 
audit fee model, the paper also makes major empirical contributions. A key empirical 
issue addressed in the study is whether assumptions of price competition in the audit 
                                                 
2
 Throughout this paper, the term large auditors merely refers to any combination of Big 8, Big 6 or Big 
5 auditors, whilst the term small auditors refers to the non-Big 8, non-Big 6 or non-Big 5 auditors 
respectively. 
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market are valid following the merger activity that saw the formation of the Big 8.
3
 To 
examine this issue, Simunic partitions the sample based on client size, with the 
assumption of price competition in the market for small audits providing a benchmark 
for comparison with the increasingly concentrated market for larger client audits. The 
results indicate no significant differences in the auditor type (large versus small) co-
efficients across the two sub-samples, indicating the assumption of price competition 
throughout the market cannot be rejected. In addition, negative co-efficients on the 
large audit firm indicator variable across the full sample is argued to be a function of 
economies of scale benefits to larger auditors. This is suggestive of larger auditors 
charging lower fees, although this finding has not been replicated in subsequent audit 
pricing studies. Structural issues raised in Simunic (1980) would influence later audit 
pricing research in Australia. 
The other key theory contribution impacting subsequent Australian audit 
pricing studies was DeAngelo (1981).
4
 DeAngelo developed the theoretical basis for 
the existence of audit quality, and its relationship with auditor size. DeAngelo defined 
audit quality as: 
(a) the probability that an auditor will discover a breach in the client’s 
accounting system, and  
(b) the probability that this breach will be reported.   
    DeAngelo (1981) provides two supply side arguments supporting a 
relationship between auditor quality and auditor size. First, large auditors make 
                                                 
3
 Such concerns about consolidation amongst accounting firms and their dominance in the market for 
large client audits are documented in the Subcommittee on Reports (1976) commonly referred to as 
‘The Metcalf Report’. Interestingly, consolidation concerns have once again been raised in Sarbanes – 
Oxley Act (2002), where a separate inquiry was held in to market concentration and its effects.  
4
 Discussion of the audit quality literature is necessarily limited in this review, and readers should 
consider the rich literature residing outside ‘economics based’ studies in the form of the behavioral 
literature. In addition, it is also acknowledged that there are contextual issues raised in the literature 
such as the implications of audit switching on audit pricing that could easily be the subject of a separate 
review.  
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significant investments in audit technologies, undertake more rigorous staff training, 
and have higher expenditures on promotion and advertising.
5
  Such investments give 
rise to greater reputation capital, which is reflected in higher partner capital 
contributions. Second, DeAngelo suggests implicit benefits of audit incumbency 
produce incentives for large auditors to provide higher quality audits. Benefits of 
incumbency include the elimination of client specific start up costs incurred by 
auditors as they ‘get to know’ new clients. On the demand side, clients are faced with 
switching costs (principally search costs) incurred when changing auditors. As a result 
of the existence of these ‘joint costs’, a bilateral monopoly exists, and the larger the 
auditors’ client base, the larger the quasi rents at stake should the auditor produce a 
poor quality audit. The auditor quality – size relationship posited by DeAngelo, and 
competition issues raised in Simunic (1980) would motivate much of the subsequent 
Australian audit pricing research.      
 
3.0 Early Australian research: Product differentiation and pricing premiums for 
large audit firms 
Following Simunic (1980) and DeAngelo (1981), the early research literature using 
Australian data namely Francis (1984), and Francis and Stokes (1986) sought to 
examine whether product differentiation might be a factor in audit pricing. Francis 
(1984) develops theoretical arguments for client demand for higher quality audits 
based on agency theory. The agency theory argument suggests that shareholders 
impose tighter monitoring on those managers who are viewed as being more 
opportunistic, or on firms that suffer from higher perceived or real agency costs. If 
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 Higher expenditure on promotion and advertising is likely to lead to greater perceived audit quality.  
 6 
tighter monitoring is demanded by shareholders, one solution would be to choose a 
higher quality auditor. 
Francis (1984) argues that if audit quality is not homogeneous, the implicit 
assumption of collusive behaviour where concentration of audit firms is high is 
incorrect. The reason is smaller auditors might choose not to invest to build the 
necessary reputation to service larger clients. This will account for the high 
concentration of audit firms in the large client market segment, rather than smaller 
auditors being ‘forced out’. In addition, since large auditors supply higher quality 
audits, they will also supply higher priced audits, given differentiated demand and a 
competitive market. These assertions form the basis of the empirical tests undertaken. 
Francis (1984) specifies the audit pricing model as follows: 
 
LAF = b0 + b1 LTA + b2 SUB + b3 CATA + b4 QUICK + b5DE + b6ROI +  
b7OPINION + b8YE + b9 LOSS + b10 AUDITOR + e         
where: 
LAF    = natural log of audit fees, 
LTA      = natural log of total assets, 
SUB    = square root of the number of subsidiaries, 
CATA    = ratio of current assets to total assets, 
QUICK   = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities, 
DE    = ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
ROI    = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets, 
OPINION = indicator variable, 1 = qualified audit report, 
YE  = indicator variable, 1 = non-June 30
th
 year end, 
LOSS  = indicator variable, 1=loss in any of the past three years, 
AUDITOR = indicator variable, 1=Big 8 auditor   
e   = error term assumed to have normal OLS regression properties. 
    
Francis (1984) selects a sample of 150 Australian listed companies over each 
year from 1974 to 1978 (30 per year), and runs the above ordinary least squares 
regression model in pooled cross section. After deleting 14 financial institutions, the 
remaining sample is split on median total assets, and the test run in both the large and 
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small client segments. The results indicate no structural differences between the two 
models, with the sign of the auditor indicator positive and significant in both cases. 
This indicates higher audit fees to the Big 8 in both the large and small segments, 
consistent with assertions of product differentiation to the Big 8. Since competition is 
the maintained assumption in the small client segment, the consistency of price 
premiums to the Big 8 across the two segments is not suggestive of collusive or 
monopolistic pricing by large auditors.  
Francis and Stokes (1986) revisit the competition issue, and argue that the 
differing empirical results (in terms of fee premium existence) between Simunic 
(1980) and Francis (1984) could be due to respective differences in auditee size across 
the two studies. By selecting a bigger sample of large and small companies, Francis 
and Stokes sought to provide further evidence on the competition issue. Using the 
same pricing model as Francis (1984), Francis and Stokes find price premiums to the 
Big 8 in the small client segment, but no Big 8 premium in the large client segment. 
This is interpreted as evidence of product differentiation to the Big 8 in the small 
client market. In the large client segment, the failure to identify Big 8 premiums is 
interpreted as the co-existence of Big 8 product differentiation, along with 
diseconomies of scale to the non-Big 8 for large client audits. The diseconomies are 
argued to force up prices of the small auditors, offsetting product differentiation 
premiums to the large auditors, resulting in no observed Big 8 premium.   
 
4.0 Pricing premiums for industry specialist auditors 
One of the most widely cited papers in the audit pricing literature is Craswell, Francis 
and Taylor (1995) [hereafter CFT]. CFT examine Simunic (1980)’s assertions that the 
pricing of audits may differ according to the industry of the auditee. CFT suggest that 
 8 
company and industry specific factors result in cross sectional differences in 
monitoring demand, including demand for industry specialists. CFT argue that the 
supply of higher quality auditors in the form of industry specialists is merely a 
response to clients who demand higher quality monitoring as a function of their 
increased agency costs. Thus the demand for quality-differentiated audits – both brand 
name audits and industry specialist audits – is grounded in agency theory (CFT, p. 
299). This differential demand for auditing leads auditors to undertake investments 
enabling the supply of differentiated audit quality in the form of Big 8/non-Big 8 
differentiation, and within Big 8 differentiation through industry specialization.  
If Big 8 auditors make these investments, they will require a normal rate of 
return on those investments (CFT, p. 301). This should be reflected in higher fees for 
large compared to small auditors and higher fees for specialist large auditors 
compared to non-specialists. CFT utilize a sizeable sample of 1484 ASX listed 
companies from 1987, and apply a cross sectional OLS regression model. The pricing 
model applied is the same as Francis (1984) with two slight modifications. First, the 
variable ‘Foreign’, (which is the proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign 
subsidiaries), is included as a further complexity control. Second, in addition to a Big 
8/nonBig 8 indicator, another test variable coded ‘1’ for industry specialist Big 8 
auditor and coded ‘0’ for a non-specialist Big 8 auditor is included in the model.  
  On top of a brand name premium, CFT find a 34% premium to auditor 
industry specialists. CFT’s findings raise two interesting issues in terms of their 
interpretation and generalisability. First, an important point to note is that specialists 
were defined as those auditors holding a 10% market share of either clients or fees in 
‘specialist’ industries. However, the presence of the fee premium at the 10% share is 
not replicated for a tighter definition of specialist at the 20% level. CFT suggest some 
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caution in interpreting their result, as it may be a product of a data artefact. It also 
raises the issue of whether the presence of economies of scale ‘kick-in’ at somewhere 
between the 10% and 20% market share level, mitigating any product differentiation 
premiums at the higher market share threshold.  
A second issue is the location of the observed premium. The premium in CFT 
is found for clients in ‘specialist’ industries; with specialist industries defined using 
the Craswell and Taylor (1991) methodology. For an industry to be defined as a 
specialist industry as per Craswell and Taylor, it must have a minimum of 30 
companies. The choice of this threshold appears arbitrary. These issues are examined 
further by Ferguson and Stokes (2002). 
Ferguson and Stokes (2002) [hereafter FS] investigate audit pricing evidence 
following the CFT study. Their analysis incorporates audit pricing implications 
following the 1989 audit firm mergers forming the Big 6, and also around the 1997 
Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merger precipitating the formation of the 
Big 5. FS pose the following two questions; Do brand name premiums persist 
following the two rounds of merger activity after CFT? Do industry specialist 
premiums persist after the same two rounds of merger activity? To test these issues 
using a more recent sample, audit fee and other necessary data from hardcopy annual 
reports and other sources for the years 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998 were acquired. The 
brand name and specialist hypotheses are re-examined using similar market share 
based definitions of specialization as CFT. Additional market share sensitivities are 
also tested in light of the merger activity, and associated concentration effects. 
The results documented in FS indicate that the general brand name distinction 
between large and small auditors is present. Second, consistent with the prior CFT 
findings, when tests of specialist premiums at various levels of market share are 
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undertaken, they produce only mixed results. For example, FS tests of specialist 
premiums using either fees or clients at the 10% and 20% cut-offs, are observed in 
only two out of four years. As a final test, the logic of the auditor quality/industry 
specialist argument is extended through tests for the existence of premiums paid to 
auditor industry leaders. Industry leadership is arguably more unequivocal and 
unambiguous signal of reputation than tests based on the arbitrary market share 
categories first adopted in CFT.
6
 Results of the tests of industry leadership identify a 
change in the strength of the audit industry leader co-efficients over time. In earlier 
years (1990 – 1992), evidence of audit industry leader premiums is reported. 
However, by 1994, this premium has weakened to the extent that when tests are run in 
specialist industries, no evidence of leader premiums is found. By 1998, no evidence 
of leader premiums is present in either tests within specialist industries or in tests 
across all industries. However, the extent to which the weakening of leadership 
premiums may be due to economies of scale benefits is hard to determine.  
Two further findings in FS are noteworthy. First, sensitivity tests show that 
when non-audit service fees are added to the dependent variable, the leadership 
premiums where observed, disappear. This indicates that audit pricing may be 
sensitive to potential non-audit service revenues.
7
 Second, in years when leadership 
premiums are observed, when each individual auditor is excluded one at a time, the 
exclusion of KPMG results in no premium being observed.
8
 This suggests that 
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 A number of anecdotal reports, as well as the marketing literature, discuss the reputation value of a 
‘leadership position’.  For example, Hellofs and Jacobsen (1999) cite efforts by Ford to maintain the 
market share required to be the top-selling car in the US  They suggest: 
“To be able to advertise “Taurus – America’s Best-Selling Car Again,” Ford resorted to offering 
$1000 rebates for the Taurus to protect its lead over Honda’s Accord as the number-one-selling car in 
the United States” (Naughton 1997). 
7
 These tests are consistent with those run by CFT p316 ‘Jointness of audit and nonaudit fees’. 
8
 Interestingly, Gramling and Stone (2001) cite prior studies suggesting that KPMG was the first Big 5 
auditor to implement organizational restructuring along industry service lines. 
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leadership fee premiums are sensitive to non-audit fees and possibly individual 
auditor brand name effects.  
In summary, the weakening of reported leadership premiums by 1994, and 
subsequent disappearance by 1998 raises further issues about the nature and existence 
of audit fee premiums. One question that remained unanswered in FS is whether the 
premium is more likely to occur at the local office level, as opposed to firm – wide or 
nationally.
9
 This question is considered by Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2003) 
[hereafter FFS (2003)]. 
 
5.0 Industry specialist premiums at the local office level 
FFS (2003) extend the investigation by FS of large audit firm product differentiation. 
FFS consider two contrasting ways of typifying the operations of Big 5 accounting 
firms.
10
 First they consider the ‘firm-wide’ perspective, where the operations of the 
Big 5 are viewed on an aggregated or national level. Under this view little 
differentiation is likely to exist across individual offices and in terms of audit pricing, 
a firm-wide measure of expertise is appropriate. In contrast, under the ‘office level’ 
perspective, each office within the network retains local idiosyncrasies. Since the 
audit contract is conducted, administered and most commonly signed-off on office 
specific letterhead, it is argued that the local office level constitutes an appropriate 
unit of analysis in its own right. Under the office-level perspective, expertise resides 
in human capital and experience of staff in each office. Thus a localised measure is 
relevant to capture industry expertise in audit pricing.  
                                                 
9
 A caveat on this test is that there is no way of knowing if only the top ranked firm earns a premium. If 
more than one firm in an industry is perceived by the market as holding a specialization, then this 
approach will misclassify some specialists as non-specialists, and thus weaken the design and statistical 
tests.  
10
 This approach is motivated by a prior study, Francis, Stokes and Anderson (1999) who used US data. 
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FFS (2003) examine industry leading and second ranked auditors both 
nationally and locally, to counter any misspecification that might result from industry 
expertise residing outside the leading firm. The evidence indicates that auditors who 
are one of the top two ranked firm’s nationally and also local industry leaders, enjoy 
24% higher fees. However, where the top two ranked firms nationally are not the local 
industry leader, no fee premiums are earned. Thus, FFS (2003) conclude that an 
auditor must hold joint city-level and national industry leadership to generate 
premiums for industry expertise. This implies the absence of any positive network 
externality across offices.   
Investigation of fee determination at the local office level is extended further 
by Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2005) [hereafter FFS (2005)]. FFS (2005) examine 
whether results in FFS (2003) might be confounded by the presence of city-specific 
overall market leadership effects. FFS (2005) reaffirm that joint local and national 
auditor expertise is valued by audit clients. In addition, they find evidence that overall 
city-specific market leadership also matters in fee determination, although at weaker 
significance levels. Their results highlight the importance of both city-specific 
industry leadership, and city-specific overall leadership in differentiating auditors.  
 
6.0 Possible research directions 
 This review has focussed on the significant contribution made by audit pricing 
studies based on Australian audit fee data over the last two decades. This period 
corresponds with the competitive advantage in the form of audit fee data availability 
Australian researchers have enjoyed vis-a-vis those in the US. A ‘level playing field’ 
with regard to audit fee disclosure raises the question of the likely direction of future 
Australian enquiry. Fortunately the dynamic state of market structure, coupled with 
 13 
regulatory interest in accounting firms point to continuing opportunities. Whilst 
current US studies are likely to be directed at least in part by issues raised in the prior 
Australian empirical research, there will be an ongoing role for Australian research 
effort in replication of US audit pricing studies. The international interest in such 
replication style papers will rest on the importance to the literature of out of US 
sample evidence. In addition to replications, the following areas come to mind as 
possible future research areas and constitute by no means an exhaustive list.  
 
6.1 Consolidation issues 
Regulatory concerns about heightened concentration in the market for audit services 
represents something of an ‘old chestnut’, and arguably first motivated Simunic 
(1980). Today however, it remains an important issue facing the profession as 
regulators across the globe continue to express concerns about concentration and its 
impact on competition.
11
 For example in a recent Australian Federal Treasury policy 
paper it is suggested: 
 
‘In short, just 10 firms service nearly 80 per cent of the market. The remainder is 
spread across firms that audit less than three listed clients. With such concentration, 
companies face a restricted pool of audit firms with experience in auditing listed 
companies. Where one of the major audit firms is providing non-audit services to a 
company, the pool of possible providers of audit services may be even more limited. 
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 For example, regulatory bodies in the US have raised recent concerns about the effects of increasing 
concentration amongst large audit firms through Sarbanes Oxley (2002). 
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Choice would be further restricted if a company did not wish to contract audit 
services from a firm that audited a major competitor’ 12 
 
Since the collapse of Arthur Andersen and its subsequent merger with the 
Ernst & Young in Australia, the number of top-tier competitors both in Australia and 
internationally has been reduced to four. Regulatory interest regarding aspects of 
concentration and competition in the audit market is being fuelled by the perceived 
profitability of the Big 4. A number of anecdotal reports are consistent with this 
assertion.
13
 Consequently, research examining potential for collusive behaviour and 
indicators of collusion such as industry profitability appear to be of interest. A point 
to note is that US fee disclosure does not extend back prior to the demise of Arthur 
Andersen in 2001, so any study examining fee effects prior to and after this event will 
benefit from data outside the US   
 
6.2 Auditor independence 
Independence concerns arising from joint supply of audit and non-audit services have 
been heightened by recent corporate collapses. Early Australian evidence on this issue 
is provided by Barkess and Simnett (1994) who also examine the determinants of 
non-audit service fees. Barkess and Simnett identify no relationship between audit 
qualifications and non-audit service fees. Wines (1994) also examines auditor supply 
of non-audit services and propensity to modify audit opinions, and finds that auditors 
sourcing more non-audit services from clients are more likely to provide a clean 
opinion. More recently Craswell (1999) finds that non-audit services do not pose 
                                                 
12 CLERP Paper No.9: Proposals for Reform – Corporate Disclosure. Part 3: The 
market for audit services.    
13
 See for example ‘Big Four, Big Worries’ BRW 10.04.03, and ‘Bloodied but Rich’ Business Week 
03.06.02 pp. 74 – 75.  
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independence threats. Thus the bulk of Australian evidence does not indicate 
independence threats through non-audit service provision.  
In terms of further effort in this area, researchers might consider that recent 
audit firm restructuring has seen consulting divisions spun-off, which arguably 
resolves some of the perceived independence threat. Consequently, research effort on 
non-audit services using Australian data will most likely evolve more along the lines 
of recent US literature such as Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and Raghunandan 
(2003). This study examines whether audit and non-audit services fees are 
simultaneously determined. This approach has not been replicated in Australia, and 
given the non-audit services sensitivity results reported in FS, joint determination 
represents an attractive research question to be applied to Australian data.  
As observed in Footnote 1, research questions involving non-audit services 
will also be encouraged by enhanced non-audit fee disclosure emanating from the 
CLERP Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act (2004). This requires a 
breakdown of amounts paid to auditors for different types of non-audit services such 
as tax, consulting, IT, audit related, accounting and due diligence to be provided in 
notes to the financial accounts.  Interesting questions such as the relationship between 
the magnitude of certain types of non-audit services and audit fees remain under-
researched. Such research questions using Australian non-audit fee disclosure will 
have the added attractiveness due to the effective US prohibition of all non-audit 
services apart from tax under Section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). Thus 
whilst the US now has comparable audit fee disclosure to Australia, we maintain a 




6.3 Measurement Issues 
A final suggestion relates to the potential for improvements in the audit quality 
proxies adopted in audit pricing studies. Gramling and Stone (2001) contains a useful 
summary including discussion of problems relating to measurement of industry 
expertise. Gramling and Stone list the three methods typically adopted in the literature 
including: (1) industry market share as a proxy for industry expertise, (2) percentage 
of an audit firm’s revenue in an industry relative to total revenue across all industries 
and (3) specialist measures based on self proclaimed industry specialization on 
accounting firm web-sites. Each of these measures of industry specialisation has 
potentially serious problems. For example, using audit fees to construct market share 
metrics to define specialisation or industry leadership creates a potential endogeneity 
problem, since the dependent variable is a log of audit fees. This highlights a more 
general problem faced by researchers in the economics of auditing field which is the 
development of valid measures of the audit quality construct.  
One approach might be to make use of capital market assessments to validate 
existing audit quality measures. An example using Australian data is Ferguson and 
Matolcsy (2004), who examine audit quality measures in a post-earnings 
announcement drift context.
14
 Ferguson and Matolcsy examine large versus small 
audit firm, industry specialist, and auditor industry leader dummies - the same audit 
quality metrics applied in FS. Interestingly, Ferguson and Matolcsy find differing 
capital market reaction when partitions are undertaken within the Big 6/5 auditors 
themselves. This result is not unsurprising given FS report that the industry specialist 
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 Another recent example of applying audit quality metrics in a capital market setting is Stevenson-
Clarke and Hodgson (2004) who examine Audit Quality and both earnings and cash response co-
efficients. They find that the use of a Big 5 auditor enhances the perceived credibility of reported 
earnings for industrial companies, but not mining firms.   
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premium disappeared when KPMG was excluded from the sample, implying that 
specialist premiums were impacted by individual auditor brand name effects.   
Two points emerge from Ferguson and Matolcsy (2004). First, it is likely that 
audit pricing research will be increasingly directed at identifying differences within 
the Big 4 as opposed to simple comparisons of large and small auditors. Second, 
novel ways of validating and assessing audit quality metrics are likely to be of interest 
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